Complex Education: Depth psychology as a mode of ethical pedagogy

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Abstract

This essay applies the material developed in The Wounded Researcher to education. The core issue in that book is the necessity to make a place for the complex unconscious in research in order to lay a foundation for an ethics that is based in deep subjectivity. The therapy room has characteristically been the place where this kind of work has occurred, and in this regard therapy has been a form of education. The boundaries of the therapy room have, however, exploded and, given the awesome powers of technology to develop and communicate information, how do we make a place for the unconscious in our educational practices? Drawing upon the work of Carl Jung this essay addresses the following questions: How does one make a place for the unconscious in the classroom, without turning teaching into therapy?; How does a teacher make a place for the unconscious dynamics in the complex interactive field among himself/herself, the students, and the material without overwhelming students?; What are the limits and dangers of this effort?; What are the consequences if we continue to ignore these dynamics in the bodies of knowledge we build? Examples from teaching my book to graduate students in psychology are provided.

Keywords: complex, unconscious, ethics, Jung

The First Experiment

In 1991 I published an article entitled ‘Complex Knowing: Towards a psychological hermeneutics’. The article was based on a graduate level class I was teaching that was focused on reading some of Freud’s case histories. The question that I wanted to explore was how one reads these texts that contain so much potentially psychoactive material. In the background of this question was my curiosity about those moments in reading any kind of text where in one way or another the reading was slowed down, where it was perhaps interrupted by some intellectual puzzlement or some felt bodily reaction to the text. Specifically, I was curious about those moments when a person would underline a passage, or write marginal notes, or discover that they had just misread a passage, or realize that for the last ten minutes or so they had fallen into a state of reverie. These pauses, it seemed to me, were pregnant with possibilities and I wondered about ‘who’ was present in those moments.

To phrase my curiosity in terms of this question ‘Who’ might seem a bit odd, but my point is that reading a text is a complex affair. In my own graduate education in clinical psychology I had studied phenomenology and hermeneutics and I understood how the
work of making sense of a text involved the circular dynamic between text and reader. The ideas of Paul Ricoeur (1970) and Hans Georg-Gadamer (1975) were particularly important for me, but, educated as well in the traditions of Freudian and Jungian psychology, I also felt that when faced with the ‘other-as-text’ in the therapy room, the circular dynamic seemed more complex. In the therapy room the field between ‘reader’ and ‘text’ was a transference field whose dynamics were more than a matter of one’s presuppositions and prejudices, whose dynamics were rooted also in the unconscious. Between the site of the classroom and the site of the therapy room, the hermeneutic circle would twist into a hermeneutic spiral. Did philosophical hermeneutics make a place for the unconscious in the ‘Hermes’ process, and if so how? These questions arose in this first experiment, but were not adequately addressed by me until the second experiment and the publication of *The Wounded Researcher* (2007), which I will take up in the next section.

This ‘who’ question is a psychological move. It is a move into the depths that personifies one’s behavior and experience. It complicates things and it differs quite radically from the question of ‘why’. The latter asks for reasons, for a reasoned and reasonable explanation. It tends to look for answers outside oneself. The former situates such explanations in a field between ‘you’ and ‘other’ that opens the possibility for a dialogue. This psychological move informs the title of my essay, specifically the two terms ‘complex’ and ‘ethical’. It says in effect that reading a text is as much a complex affair as is falling in love, or writing an article, and that, if our pedagogical practices are to be ethical, educators have to take this psychological complexity into account.

The question of ‘who’ acknowledges the complex character(s) of one’s identity at levels that are often quite unconscious. It is a challenging question, because it acts like a solvent that dissolves our Cartesian dream of the person whose sense of self is guaranteed by a ‘cogito’ that is singular, isolated and a spectator of an inanimate world-as- spectacle mapped in terms of univocal and determinable meanings (Romanyshyn, 1989/2000). As educator David Jardine, however, persuasively argues, this challenge is hardly ever acknowledged. He writes, ‘We are silently living out Descartes’s dream-turned-nightmare’ (1998, p. 9).

In this dream-turned-nightmare so much of our educational practice forgets or ignores that the student who comes to the classroom is and is not the character(s) who come for an education. ‘Who’ is present is a complex question. The same complexity, of course, applies to the teacher. Here too one has to avoid confusing the person who comes to teach with the character(s) who are teaching. In my own life the teachers who deeply educated me were characters who also had character, my first philosophy professor, for example, who on hot summer days with the sleeves of his starched white shirt rolled up kept young men of 19 and 20 enthralled with the arcane mysteries of Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa*. Through him Aquinas and the world he inhabited entered the classroom, and because of that it did not seem so arcane to me that Aquinas would ask how many angels could fit on the head of a pin?

When I teach my introductory psychotherapy class to clinical students I begin with this challenge to the assumption of univocal identity. So, I say upfront that the first thing one must do is to avoid confusing the person who comes to therapy with the characters who come for therapy, with those characters whose abode are the symptoms. And, I emphasize that the same caution applies to the therapist. Jung’s diagram of the transference aptly
describes the complexity of this field (CW 16, para. 422). Analyst and patient interact not only at the level of their conscious egos, but each is also engaged with their own unconscious complexes. In addition, the ego of the patient is dynamically in touch with the unconscious of the analyst and vice versa. Finally, the unconscious of the patient interacts with the unconscious of the analyst and vice versa. Six variations of who is present inform this complex transference field. Six characters set the stage, as it were, for this dramatic encounter.

Starting here the education of a therapist who makes a place for the unconscious begins with learning how to read the signs not only of the other ‘who’ is present, but also of the ‘others’ who implicitly inform of his or her presence. The biggest obstacle in this work is the literal frame of mind that is corollary to the assumption of identity as univocal in the manner of Cartesian Cogito. And what works best here in the education of a therapist is the move to a metaphoric sensibility. I will say more about this later but for the moment I can easily illustrate what I mean with this simple example. Learning to read the differences between the person and the character(s) is no different from what happens when one goes to the theater. In that place one does not confuse the person of the actor with the character(s) portrayed, unless the actor is very bad. When Dustin Hoffman, for example, shuffles on stage as Willy Loman, a tired, broken and beaten man, it is Willy who is present and who evokes from the person in the audience some character(s) whose emotional responses to Willy’s tragedy companion that person when he or she leaves the theater. Within the context of this ‘who’ question the therapy room becomes a theater, a place for the characters to tell their tales.

The same, I would argue, is true of the classroom if we begin with this question of ‘who’. The classroom is also a theater whose landscapes transform the neutral, architectural space of the room into a place where the characters meet. In both sites the work of imagination is taking place, and education becomes to a great extent a matter of leading and being led into other worlds of possibility. Even subjects like science or mathematics, which in devotion to facts and rules would seem to be well beyond the ken of imagination, can become in the hands of a teacher-as-character an awakening of the heart.

For example, many years ago when my oldest son was in the first grade his teacher, who was in her first assignment, was introducing the students to the science of the solar system. She was enthusiastic but quite bound to the facts. So, when my son came home one afternoon and simply threw his paper on the table as he dashed outdoors to play, I saw that she had given him a zero for his remarks about the earth’s relation to the sun. In response to the question—‘Does the earth move?’—he had checked ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Inviting him on a walk I asked him to tell me about his answer. He said with all the innocent confidence of one who was 6 years old, that when he and I were walking the earth did not move. He went on to explain to me that it moved only if we took a rocket ship into space.

Of course, he was correct, but his answer flew in the face of the facts of science as his teacher was presenting them. I knew that what he was speaking about was science as a perspective, as a way of knowing the world and being in it, but from the point of view of science what is real and true is that the earth is a planet in motion. My son did not, of course, use this language of perspective. He was simply staying faithful to the fact that living as an astronaut on a planet in space is not the same as living on the ground of earth.
as an embodied being. He was being ‘who’ he was, two different ‘characters’ in two different worlds. He had not yet been led out of himself into that place of mind that leaves the body behind (Romanyshyn, 1989/2000).

Children are wonderful educators and I realized that here was a challenge that I had to take. I had become deeply interested in the theme of science as a perspective and in the issue of how it was being taught in primary schools. Thus I offered to come to his class and his teacher happily accepted.

On the appointed day I came with a microscope and several prepared slides. My intent was not to challenge the validity of the facts of science. Rather, I wanted to demonstrate a difficult philosophical point: that science was a perspective that required a specific attitude toward the world and the body. But how should I do that? And for whom? ‘Who’ were six-year-olds? What was it like to be six and sitting at a desk listening to someone who, like their parents, was an adult? ‘Who’ should come into the classroom? That day ‘I’, father to my son, became a magician. Saying this I need to add that this character was as much created by the circumstances, as it was a conscious, deliberate choice. I lived in the space of the classroom as a magician. It was not a technique.

As I showed each slide I made a drama about the attitude necessary to see the world with a microscopic eye. Before I would bend down to look through the microscope I would wave and say ‘goodbye’. Then I would pop up quickly and say, ‘Oops! I forgot to close one eye’ and then I would wave again and repeat my goodbye. The final moment was a loud, amazed ‘Wow’ as I looked at the slides I had prepared.

Every child in that room wanted to see what was under the microscope, and as each in turn took their place at the microscope they repeated the entire performance, culminating in their amazed ‘wows’. In addition many of them made up stories about what they saw, the grain of pepper, for example, became a rock that they put on their hamburgers.

Something magical had happened, that kind of magic that happens at the theater, that kind of magic that releases us from the tyranny of the ‘real’, that kind of magic that is the work of imagination. In addition, in their enthusiasm the students had learned that microscopic vision was a special way of being embodied in the world. They had learned this attitude by enacting it; they had built what they had learned into their bodies through the gestures of taking leave of their surroundings, repeating what Isaac Newton had done in 1666, when to study light he went into a dark room, cut a small hole in his window shade and placed between that portal and his singular, fixed eye a small prism through which, to the dismay of the poet John Keats, he unwove the rainbow and rewove it as a spectrum (Romanyshyn, 1980).

To be sure, another poet, Alexander Pope, praised Newton for this singular vision, when he said, ‘Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night,/God said, “Let Newton be!”/And all was light’ (Nicolson, 1960, p. 154). Both poets, of course, were right. In that moment when the rainbow became a spectrum something was lost and gained. Too often, however, we forget the cost and education becomes indoctrination. When no child is to be left behind, still—tested, measured, mapped and regulated—what is left behind is the imagination. In this context history is no longer a living reality and figures like Newton, Keats and Pope are no longer characters who live on in the imagination.
On this day, however, they were there, invisible companions bending over the microscope with those children, haunting that third world between the world of sense and the world of intellect that the philosopher Henri Corbin termed the imaginal, and which for Jung is the landscape of the psyche, a world that is neither a matter of fact nor an idea of mind, but which is as real as these other two. Hillman (1975, 1981), drawing on Corbin, has explored this autonomous reality whose organ of perception is the heart and which opens to the creative imagination. Others like Watkins (1986/2000), Goodchild (2001, 2006) and Raff (2000) have deepened our understanding of this domain of reality and it is at the heart of the imaginal approach to research in The Wounded Researcher. It is also at the heart of an approach to education that makes a place for the many levels of the unconscious and all those characters ‘who’ dwell there.

Of course, the children of this day did not know any of this in any conscious or self-conscious way and the lesson of science as a perspective still needed to be taught. The magician had to give way to someone else, but ‘who?’

Here I need to anticipate a point about the imaginal approach to education, which I will explore again later: the place in education for what Jung calls the feeling function. In the enthusiasm of what had happened something was lost and a sense of sadness informed my final question to them. But how to bring this feeling-toned question into the room without spoiling the enthusiasm?

I had also come with a pair of scissors and a fresh slide, and when all the prepared ones were finished I asked for a volunteer who would allow me to snip a strand of hair. A girl with a flaming red mane of hair quickly raised her hand. Carefully, like Newton had cut that small hole in his shade to admit only a ray of light, I cut one piece of that red hair and placed it on the slide. I repeated the earlier performance, but this time in place of the amazed ‘wow’ I ended with a puzzled look on my face. The absence of ‘wow’ caught their attention, and a few actually spoke it for me. But I glanced back and forth a few times between the single strand of hair under the microscope and the wavy fullness of the girl’s red hair. The difference that I knew to be the case had to be felt in the moment lest it be only a technique. It had to be embodied by the one who was living the difference as if experienced for the first time. I waited, lingering in my puzzlement. Then I asked my final question.

Is there anyone, I asked, who could think of something that could not be put and seen under a microscope. The question was not greeted with silence. On the contrary, there was almost unanimous agreement that anything could be cut up and placed under the microscope. One boy even said he could do that to his brother, a rather clear and disturbing indication of the complexity of education. But I waited and repeated my question, wanting to illustrate now how science as a perspective had to look at things separated from their living context. And then from the back of the room a hand was raised. A blond haired girl with a soft lisp said that she knew something that could not be seen under a microscope. She paused—embarrassed?—and said, ‘a smile’.

I grant that six-year-olds can be an embarrassment to philosophers and psychologists with our grand theories of education. I also grant that the classroom landscape of six-year-olds and that of sophisticated graduate students are not quite the same thing, and yet I would argue that a place for embodied education and the feeling function to

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open the imagination applies in both situations. Indeed, if we enter any classroom unknowingly ensconced within the Cartesian dream, not only does imagination wither, it also stays outside the door where the body is left behind. Education then becomes a matter of imparting information by a teacher-as-cogito, disembodied and disconnected from a feeling and passionate connection to his/her words. Teaching as a vocation becomes reduced to a narrow profession designed to educate its members into a set of skills that can be observed, quantified, measured and organized within a set of goals that lay out the territory even before one has entered into it.

It is not surprising, therefore, that within the space of this dream-turned-nightmare David Jardine tells the tale of another smile, of a student teacher whose students seemed to be disinterested. Commenting on his observations that during the class she seemed herself to be elsewhere, he reports that her response to this observation was to ask him if she should smile more. Here is technique with a vengeance and it illustrates that when we lose touch with the embodied characters of ‘who’ is teaching, with the complexity of this vocation, we also lose touch with those who seek to learn. Within this dream-turned-nightmare and with skills in hand we remain disconnected from the others ‘without’, from those who are our contemporary existential companions. And disconnected from them we also remain disconnected from the others ‘within’. We lose touch with our complex psychological companions who haunt our presence and inform our ways of being with our existential companions, who are themselves also complex ways of being with us.

In the Cartesian dream-turned-nightmare, education becomes a matter of method and technique designed to ward off the messy ambiguity of complexity. As I showed in The Wounded Researcher this warding off is the psychological function of method when method is made primary. It is, moreover, the point that the ethno-psychoanalyst George Devereux (1967) made more than forty years ago in his sadly neglected book, From Anxiety to Method in the Behavioral Sciences. His title says it all.

But no precision of method can dispel the anxiety that comes from giving a place to the embodied complexities of encounter. Gaston Bachelard alludes to this point when he writes, ‘I am not the same man when I am reading a book of ideas ... as when I am reading a poet’s book ...’ (1969, p. 65). Bachelard’s ‘I’ is anything but singular or isolated. Indeed, it is informed by—formed in relation to—a field, and the two different texts correspond to two different others who read these texts. The Bachelardian ‘I’ is a paradox of identity within difference: the man who reads a book of ideas or a book of poems is and is not the person of Gaston Bachelard. We have, I would assert, an ethical obligation to take into account this complexity in our educational praxes. We have an ethical obligation to make a place for the educator ‘who-is-a-character’.

Attending to this issue of the characters that we are is an initial step toward becoming aware of the connection between being a character and having character. This step is an encounter with the unconscious, with those characters who dwell in the margins of a text and draw us into reveries. In this regard, an ethical pedagogy based in Jung’s work would seem to converge with that specific subfield in educational philosophy called moral or character education.

After a certain point in life a person, according to Albert Camus, is responsible for their face. Those lines and marks are traces of the characters that are etched in the
flesh. True objectivity is not gained by ignoring these characters who borrow our eyes. True objectivity comes from engaging them. True objectivity comes through deep subjectivity.

It is not my intention here to discuss the results of this first experiment except to say that after I finished the article I took up its themes in my teaching and writing at Pacifica Graduate Institute. Hired in 1992 to lay a foundation for an approach to research that would fit within the institute’s Jungian orientation, I published in 2007 The Wounded Researcher, the culmination of a fifteen-year effort to make a place for the complex unconscious and its correlates in the classroom. But as I realized along the way, this work was at its core a book about ethics, specifically about an ethics rooted in the unconscious. In this context, the issue of research has been and is the means by which this work becomes a reflection on education and the task of making the bodies of knowledge we create and teach into ethical epistemologies.

Today, this obligation to build ethical ways of knowing the world and being in it is, perhaps, the primary issue, because as I have tried to show in some reflections on technology (Romanyshyn, 1989/2000, 1993, 1994) the absence of such ethical epistemologies leads to epistemological violence. Education cannot continue in that context. Education has to be subversive of the conventional order, and one of the ways to achieve that is to attend to the place of unconscious dynamics in the classroom, and to the ways that in its being ignored perpetuate violence. Jung makes this point when he writes:

The teacher must not be a merely passive upholder of culture; he must actively promote that culture through his own self-education. His culture must never remain at a standstill, otherwise he will start correcting in the children those faults which he has neglected in himself. This is manifestly the antithesis of education. (CW 17, para. 110)

Jung’s deepening of the unconscious is particularly important in this process of self-education because in his formulation of the psychoid archetype the unconscious links not only all humanity at a collective level, but also all of us to nature. And so, for example, we have to make a place in our teaching for the melting polar ice caps (Romanyshyn, 2008), because education as a matter of mind divorced from body is also education divorced from nature. Such education, which leaves things as they are, not only fails to be responsive to these complex webs, it is also irresponsible.

Between 1991 and 2007 the task of complex knowing became personified as the wounded researcher. Along the way one issue that has remained pivotal is the necessity to avoid identifying education with therapy or worse reducing education to therapy. If both are sites of theater, they are different theaters: the classroom is not the therapy room.

Jung is quite clear about this point. Speaking of the practical application of the methods used in analytical psychology, he says, ‘The practical application of these would be out of the question for the ordinary teacher, and an amateurish or half-serious use of them is to be severely discouraged, although some knowledge of them on the part of the teacher is certainly desirable’ (CW 17, para. 108).

The point then is not the direct application of the principles of analytic therapy by the teacher to the classroom. The point is that the educator has to be educated in such a way that
he or she does not perpetuate in the classroom the complex dynamics of an unconscious life. *The question of teacher preparation is central.* Just as we expect a surgeon’s hand to be free of germs, we should expect the educator’s psyche to be as free as possible of the complex contaminants of an unconscious life. Addressing some of the fundamental questions of psychotherapy, Jung notes with respect to the therapist, ‘for only what he can put right in himself can he hope to put right in the patient’ (*CW* 16, para. 239). Educating the other has to begin with and continue to be educating oneself. So, if we do not ignore—cannot afford to ignore!—the unconscious complexities of education, then how do we make a place for the unconscious in the classroom without turning the classroom into the therapy room? How do we make a place for the wounded educator? *The Wounded Researcher* is and has been the second experiment with this issue.

### The Second Experiment

No investigator, however unprejudiced and objective he is, can afford to disregard his own complexes, for they enjoy the same autonomy as those of other people. As a matter of fact, he cannot disregard them because they do not disregard him. Complexes are very much a part of the psychic constitution, which is the most absolutely prejudiced thing in every individual. His constitution will therefore inexorably decide what psychological view a given observer will have. Herein lies the unavoidable limitation of psychological observation: its validity is contingent upon the personal equation of the observer. (Jung, *CW* 8, para. 213)

With one small change of terms from investigator/observer to educator, Jung’s words apply to education as a complex affair. His diagram of the complex transference field in psychotherapy also depicts the transference field of the classroom. When one crosses the threshold of the classroom, one’s complex constitution does not magically fade away; it is not deposited on the other side of that threshold.

Moreover, while Jung’s statement clearly shows that his psychology belongs to the tradition of hermeneutics, and, while it also indicates a radical break with that tradition because it gives a place to the complex constitution of ‘who’ does the work of interpretation, it also betrays Jung’s own complex constitution. The use of the masculine personal pronoun throughout the quote shows the cultural-historical complex of patriarchy in his work. No one is exempt from this complex ‘personal equation’ and a sense of self as *a-priori* identity.

*The Wounded Researcher* makes a place for a complex hermeneutics. Modeling itself on the procedures in depth psychology that make a place for the unconscious in psychotherapy, it makes a place for the unconscious in the research process. However, since the educator is also a complex psychological being, a *place must also be made for the unconscious in the processes of education*. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, *making such a place is an ethical obligation*, a point to which I will return in the final section of this essay. Jung establishes the ground for this obligation:

> The present day shows with appalling clarity how little able people are to let the other man’s argument count, although this capacity is a fundamental and
indispensable condition for any human community. Everyone who proposes to come to terms with himself must reckon with this basic problem for, to the degree that he does not admit the validity of the other person, he denies the ‘other’ within himself the right to exist—and vice versa. The capacity for inner dialogue is a touchstone for outer objectivity. (CW 8, para. 187)

Jung wrote those words in 1916 and so the present day that he refers to was nearly one hundred years ago. It is very doubtful if in that span of time things have gotten any better. Indeed, given the pace of technology over this period of time, especially with respect to its capacity to increase our powers of destruction, things have gotten worse. The Wounded Researcher makes a place for the unconscious in multiple ways. In this part of my essay I want to summarize some of these contributions, which I have employed with students and which are equally applicable to the education of theeducator.

Cultivating a Metaphoric Sensibility

Earlier I mentioned that in the education of a psychotherapist who would make a space for the unconscious in the therapy room, the cultivation of a metaphoric sensibility is an essential first step. It is so because, in undoing one’s unexamined assumptions about the univocal identity of ‘who’ a patient is, it opens up an image of ‘who’ that patient might be like, an image of the patient-as-a-character with a story. The cultivation of a metaphoric sensibility is also the first step if one is to make a place for the unconscious in the classroom. Such a sensibility leads one out of an addiction to fixed, linear and literal ways of thinking. It fosters a disposition that is hospitable to paradox and ambiguity. It develops that attitude of negative capability that John Keats described as the ability ‘of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason’ (Barnard, 1973, p. 539).

The image quality of a metaphor taxes the irritable mind. It situates that mind in the space where meaning is unhinged from its usual moorings to either things or thoughts, where meaning is neither a matter of fact about things, events or persons in the world nor an idea of mind. It places one in that imaginal domain, which, as I indicated earlier was explored by Henri Corbin, and which was described by him as ‘... the intermediate world ... between the intellectual and the sensible, in which the Active Imagination as imaginatio vera is an organ of understanding mediating between intellect and sense ...’ (Bloom, 1958/1969, p. xvi).

In this intermediate domain the logic of either/or gives way to another logic, to a neither/nor way of knowing the world and being in it. This shift is essential to changing the culture and climate of the classroom. It begins the work of transforming education from being a matter of transmitting information and/or imposing values to education as an awakening of the curious and creative imagination. The neither/nor logic of a metaphoric sensibility is a provisional way of knowing and as such it offers an epistemological foundation for Jung’s psychology of the unconscious.

In one of his most seminal essays, ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’, Jung affirms the radical implications of the unconscious. Its discovery, he says, ‘is of absolutely revolutionary significance in that it could radically alter our view of the world’. It would do so,
he adds, because any serious consideration of it would force us to acknowledge that, ‘our view of the world can be but a provisional one’ (CW 8, para. 369–370). Susan Rowland amplifies this point when, commenting on Jung as a writer, she writes, ‘Anything derived merely from rationality risks being profoundly inauthentic unless it also bears witness to the destabilizing presence of the unconscious’. Attending to this destabilizing influence, she says, Jung’s psychology was ‘an attempt to evoke in writing what cannot be entirely grasped: the fleeting momentary presence of something that forever mutates and reaches beyond the ego’s inadequate understanding’ (2005, p. 3).

Jung’s psychology does move through several iterations, and one can find in his work traces of a Cartesian metaphysics, a Kantian influence and Platonic overtones. And yet there is a telos in his work grounded in the reality of the image and perhaps best realized in his works on alchemy. The metaphor of alchemy is a bridge between his earlier Gnostic interests and his later explorations into the relations between his psychology of the unconscious and quantum physics. For our purposes I want only to underscore that this metaphor of alchemy places the image at the center of Jung’s vision of psychological life. Any education, then, which would take into account the psychological depths of mind has to attend to the reality of the image.

What does so is a metaphoric sensibility. It emphasizes how the alchemy of metaphor releases the image in the experience. Via the image, this alchemy of metaphoric language works between the construction of meaning and its de-construction. Every metaphor is, as it were, like the ‘vas’ of alchemy where the material being worked on was transformed, where the lead was turned into gold. According to Jungian analyst Edward Edinger (1984) of all the processes at work in this work of transformation two were essential: coagulatio and solutio. The therapist—or the educator—who would be master of metaphor, who would make use of metaphor with awareness, is an alchemist, who on one hand coagulates or fixes a meaning and on the other hand dissolves it into a possibility of creating ever-new meanings.

In educating my students into this domain of the image, I often use the simple example offered by the literary critic Howard Nemerov. ‘What is a purple finch?’ I ask, and for anyone who is not a bird enthusiast the question is a puzzle. Following Nemerov I read them the factual description found in Peterson’s field guide, but note that Nemerov himself is not convinced by these matters of fact that the bird that he sees in his garden while thinking about the mystery of metaphor is a purple finch. Then I read the last statement in the field guide: a purple finch is a sparrow dipped in raspberry juice! Nemerov then says that thorough this image he is certain that the bird he sees in his garden is a purple finch. And he says that this recognition is not quite canny.

Of course! The claim is uncanny. It is an irritating claim but that is the point. It destablizes the comfortable ways in which we have settled into thinking in terms of either things out there or thoughts in here, of either a world of facts or a mind full of ideas. It challenges us to think about how we think about the world. On one hand, the metaphor of a sparrow dipped in raspberry juice is not a fact that one can validate with empirical tests. No photo would show any traces of a bird soaked with juice, and even if in a fit of empirical frenzy one managed to rush into the garden and take hold of the bird, one’s hands would not drip with juice.
On the other hand, the metaphor is not simply an idea in Nemerov’s mind. The metaphor turns Nemerov toward the world—the purple finch is there in his garden! The metaphor escorts him, as it were, into the world. It is the subtle bridge between perception and thought, the bridge that connects matter and mind. The image quality of the metaphor opens a vision. It is the lens of the eye of imagination that sees through the density of the world, an eye so different from Newton’s prismatic eye that took him into his darkened room away from the world. It is an eye that led the visionary poet William Blake to pray, ‘May God us keep/From Single Vision and Newton’s Sleep’ (Erdman, 1981, p. 693), an eye that sees into the invisible depths of the world, that invisible of the visible that is at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodied perception (1964/1968).

In addition to Nemerov’s metaphor I often also use the example of Magritte’s painting entitled ‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’. It is a wonderful visual metaphor that shows a pipe but whose title undoes what one is seeing. In the very act of perception what is shown to be a pipe is not a pipe. Here the painting itself is that alchemical ‘vas’ where the categories of reality and representation are open to question. One looks at the painting and these fixed categories are dissolved. One is forced to wonder again. The alchemy of metaphor resides in the tension between the ‘is’ and ‘is not’ of metaphor. On the side of the metaphor ‘is’ a metaphor seems to adhere to the logic of A=A, the logic of identity. A thing is what it is. A person is who he is and about this ‘what’ or ‘who’ there hovers no ambiguity. The identity pole of a metaphor affirms that things and people have self-identity. On the other side of this tension, however, the metaphor ‘is not’ undoes these adhesions. It erases the = sign; it dissolves the self-identity of the thing and the person.

The ‘is not’ pole of metaphor makes a big difference. Hidden, as it were, in the shadow of the ‘is’ of metaphor, the ‘is not’ of metaphor does its work of opening the imagination. It works its alchemy in the darkness of the light that shines forth from the ‘is’ pole of a metaphor. It works its alchemy one might say in twilight or in dark light. In this dark light the ‘is not’ pole trails a question that annoyingly lingers and asks if A is not A, then what is it? What is A (like) if it is not itself? This ‘is not’ pole takes one into thinking about paradoxes and correspondences, about similarities and differences, about relationships and resemblances. In this respect David Jardine makes an excellent point when he cites the work of Wittgenstein on the nature of analogical language. He says that Wittgenstein’s work portrays the ‘deeply dialogical and analogical character of lived-experience, the deeply conversational nature of life as it is actually lived, with its irresolvable and potent “family resemblances” and kinships’ (1998, p. 26, his italics). A metaphoric sensibility seems to be not only an epistemological foundation for Jung’s psychology, but also the foundation for a psychology that stays rooted in embodied life.

In the climate of education today where emphasis is placed on the establishment of clear goals and objectives and the measurement of competencies, the cultivation of a metaphoric sensibility in service to the imagination with its delight in paradox and ambiguity seems foolish. Indeed, its cultivation seems as foolish as alchemy and as useless as a poem. Elsewhere (Romanyshyn, 2002) I have written in defense of being a fool and in defense of being useless, but the best defense comes in the very enactment of these qualities in the classroom. One has to risk being a fool if education is to have the depth of the psyche, if it is to have the courage to dissolve fixed and unexamined

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knowledge—unconscious metaphors that function as projections—if it is to begin with how we are addressed by what is unknown. And so, I often use a poem as a third way of cultivating a metaphoric sensibility.

The poem is ‘Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’ by Wallace Stevens. My intention is to show how the blackbird as an object of perception in this poem is a matter of perspective, and then by analogy to suggest that one is always in some perspective, myth, dream, fantasy or complex even though one does not know what that is. To give weight to the point I set the stage with a fable, suggesting that each of the thirteen stanzas are spoken by experts in ornithology who have come together at a conference to present their definitive findings on the nature of the blackbird. Inviting each of thirteen students to speak one of the thirteen stanzas, I let the process unfold and then ask, ‘Which expert is correct?’ ‘Which of the thirteen views is the truth?’.

More often than not the students have a living, felt sense of the hermeneutic circle in the work of understanding, and they come to appreciate the necessity of dialogue with the other’s point of view. In The Wounded Researcher this fable appears in the final chapter of the book devoted to the issue of what constitutes an ethical epistemology. My argument there is that the capacity to hear the other is inseparable from the capacity to regard one’s position as a point of view and vice versa, the point that Jung makes and which I quoted earlier in this paper. But as I also said and as Jung also makes quite clear this capacity to allow the other person’s argument to count is difficult and rare. It requires that one is able to make a place for the reality of his/her complexes. In the context of education it requires the capacity, courage and commitment to make a place for the unconscious.

A metaphor is a perspective. It is a way of ‘seeing’ that betrays ‘who’ one is who lives within that metaphor. Moreover, we dwell within metaphors whose roots reach deeply into personal, familial, and cultural-historical depths. A good example here would be the Western cultural-historical metaphor of technology, which in being lived out unconsciously has functioned as a symptom and collective dream (Romanyshyn, 1989/2000, 2008). The cultivation of a metaphoric sensibility is this first step toward making a place for the unconscious. Insofar as that first step requires the capacity to hear the other, making a place for the unconscious also involves an education in learning how to listen.

**Education as Awakening Vocation**

For Jung the symbol is a bridge between the unconscious and consciousness. It is a manifestation of the transcendent function, the language of the dream, the means by which ‘the unknowable substance ... of the unconscious always represents itself to consciousness ...’ (CW 11, para. 810) The symbol also serves the same function in Freud’s work, connecting and translating the unconscious into consciousness, a work of translation that in turn requires translation, situating the encounter with psyche within the tradition of hermeneutics and, as I argued above, necessitating the cultivation of metaphoric sensibility as the epistemological counterpart of the ontological reality of the psyche as a matter of symbols and their images.

Any education, therefore, that would address the whole person—the embodied mind in its psychological depths—would have to make a place for *symbolic ways of knowing*...
alongside empirical and rational ways of knowing. In this respect, I would claim that the therapy room that appears at the end of the 19th century marks a new threshold between the academic classroom with its education of mind and the medical clinic with its treatment of the body. In this gap between mind and body the first neurotics address us from the abyss of Descartes’ nightmare, blindly stumble across the threshold into Freud’s consulting rooms, and, with their abysmal hysterical symptoms that now re-fuse and con-fuse the material body and the unconscious mind, offer a new form of education. Paul Ricœur in his now classic work on Freud alludes to this point when he says:

After the silence and forgetfulness made widespread by the manipulation of empty signs and the construction of formalized languages, the modern concern for symbols expresses a new desire to be addressed. (1970, p. 31)

To be addressed is to be summoned by something or someone other than oneself. Education that begins with this summons is an education that awakens a vocation. Jung’s psychology of individuation is this kind of education.

In his essay, ‘The Development of Personality’, Jung situates his call for a pedagogy that would serve the whole person within a trenchant critique of the educational practices of his day, which continue into our own time to the degree that such practices leave out of the picture the unconscious depths of mind. He says of those who employ such practices that they ‘are half-baked educators who are not human beings at all, but walking personifications of method’, not unlike the example of the student teacher cited above by David Jardine who asked if she should smile more. Continuing, he says, ‘Anyone who wants to educate must himself be educated’, which means coming to know one’s own complex presence in the classroom. Indeed, Jung argues that to the degree that we shirk this responsibility we foster an image of the educated adult as one who has ‘a solid conviction of his own competence’, which would remove ‘Any doubt or feeling of uncertainty ... undermining the necessary faith in his own authority’. But the end result of this program he says is that, ‘The professional man is irretrievably condemned to be merely competent’ (CW 17, para. 284).

While the education of psychotherapists is woefully guilty on this score—competence in technique dominates over the shaping of character—I suspect that a similar condition exists in the field of pedagogy. But, Jung says, ‘Children are not half as stupid as we imagine’ (CW 17, para. 286). They are imagined as such only because we regard them in the shadow of the image of the one condemned to be merely competent, a regard that Jung suspects harbors the unconscious complexes of adult life that are projected onto the child. Cultivating the imagination then becomes a casualty of a system of education that unconsciously imposes upon the child this task of becoming merely competent.

But, and this is Jung’s point, education cannot and should not ask of the ‘other’ what one has not done oneself. Education cannot and should not perpetually pass on to the next generation the task of making a place for the unconscious. In his essay he equates becoming aware of one’s unconscious dynamics with the development of the individuated personality, about which he says the following:

The achievement of personality means nothing less than the optimum development of the whole individual human being. It is impossible to foresee the
endless variety of conditions that have to be fulfilled. A whole lifetime is needed. Personality is the supreme realization of the innate idiosyncrasy of a living being. It is an act of high courage flung in the face of life, the absolute affirmation of all that constitutes the individual, the most successful adaptation of the universal conditions of existence coupled with the greatest possible freedom for self-determination. To educate a man to this seems to me no light matter. (CW 17, para. 289, his italics)

Education that does take up this task as no light matter aims toward the development of the individuated human being, who in the context of the above quote, is one who can take up the universal conditions of human existence in a manner that is transformative not only of himself or herself but also of those same conditions. Such an individual is not the monstrosity of the one who is a law unto himself or herself, which is only the superficial and narcissistic form of the individuated personality. This is education in bad taste. On the contrary, he or she is the one who is faithful, as Jung puts it, ‘to the law of one’s own being’ (CW 17, para. 295), and this fidelity, he says, is more than a matter of courage and necessity. In the final analysis, what induces a person ‘to rise out of unconscious identity with the mass as out of a swathing mist’, is ‘what is commonly called vocation: an irrational factor that destines a man to emancipate himself from the herd and from its well worn path’ (CW 17, paras. 299–300).

Education that too tightly scripts the program, that too early and too rigidly maps the path leaves no room for such irrational factors, for those moments that would allow one to be addressed by the law of one’s own being, to that vocation fidelity to which not only affirms one’s destiny but also puts one in service to something other and larger than oneself. The mythic figure of Orpheus is an archetypal background for this form of education. As the only poet who was allowed back into the city by Plato, Orpheus personifies that shaman-poet-lover whose words simultaneously awaken the slumbering soul from its forgetfulness and align it with its destiny. In this respect, he is the poet of anamnesis, which is a term that connotes a movement upward into memory, a movement of return from a state of being without memory, a movement upward and back from forgetting.

Orpheus is a poet whose education is against forgetting, a poet whom Plato contrasts with the mimetic poets like Homer and Hesiod whose words induce in their listeners a life of imitative identification with traditional values. Welcoming Orpheus into the polis, Plato is creating a new form of education in Greek life. In an essay on the Orphic roots of Jung’s psychology, I argued that Plato’s reform of education reappears in Jung’s approach to psychotherapy. ‘The creation of the therapy room at the end of the nineteenth century’ I said, ‘was a creation of a new form of the Polis where the symbolic speech of dreams was spoken in a voice that is closer to the poet than it is to anything else’ (2004, p. 57). I also showed how in that place the symptomatic expression of the suffering soul, its psychopathology, was and is the reappearance of the mimetic and the Orphic poets, and how Freud’s and Jung’s psychologies are related but different forms of education.

Freudian psychotherapy is a form of education that attends to the symptom as a matter of enslavement to repetitive patterns, which chains a person to a life of unconscious
mimetic identification. There is a stoic aspect to this form of education. One learns here to suffer one’s fate with tragic resolve.

Jung’s psychotherapy, on the other hand, attends to the symptom as vocation and as such it is a form of education that awakens soul to its Orphic voice and leads it into the law of its own being, thus placing it in service to something other and larger than itself. One’s life becomes part of a story that has archetypal resonances and one discovers how the many forms of ‘who’ one is in life are like those archetypal characters who become our companions along the way. This is the creative aspect of the symptom, the way in which a wound in life can become a work, the way in which education might even come to be a matter of homecoming.

Regardless of whatever preference one might have for one or the other of these forms of education, my point in that article was that the therapy room has given us an opportunity for a new form of education, one, as I said earlier, that spans the abyss between a mind cut off from its own psychological depths, the reasonable mind cut off from its own shadows, the enlightened mind oblivious of its darkness, and a body severed from that mind. It is a form of education, which in attending to the mimetic and Orphic voices of ‘who’ dwells in the symptom, is a poiesis, a term that emphasizes education as a creative act with all the attendant consequences of risk, of being the fool who, to borrow the apt title of an essay by David Miller, has ‘Nothing to Teach! No Way to Teach It! Together with the Obligation to Teach’, is useless. Miller’s essay ‘is a critique of the imposition of the language of assessment and accountability onto those realms of human experience that cannot be counted but which nevertheless do count’ (Miller, 2006, p. 217). As such it is a form of education that is counter not only to education as indoctrination, but also to any forms that place their emphasis only on either dispensing information or training in techniques.

The opportunity has been squandered. The therapy room has remained cut off from the classroom, the suffering soul as a form of education not only imprisoned there but also indoctrinated with the very same cultural-historical dreams that made its presence inevitable. Speaking in this way I am not, as I said before, advocating that the classroom become a therapy room. That would not only be dangerous, it would also be unethical. The differences between these two sites of education have to be honored. And yet, any form of education that would ignore the reality of the unconscious in its shadow and creative aspects is also dangerous and unethical. Jung clearly spoke to this dilemma and the cautions that must be exercised in his essay ‘The Significance of the Unconscious in Individual Education’ (CW 17); in The Wounded Researcher I acknowledged these same issues.

If we are to recover what has been squandered, then ways have to be found that do make a place for how we are addressed by the unconscious in its many manifestations. The Wounded Researcher has been and is an attempt in that direction. It is a beginning. The alchemical hermeneutic method, for example, makes a place for dreams, symptoms and other expressions of the unconscious in the educational process, including the functions of feeling and intuition as Jung describes them. It also makes a place for the body in the process. But to present all that material would double the size of this essay, and there is a final and crucial point to be made about education as a matter of vocation. Therefore,
I can say only that the book offers numerous examples from my students whose work illustrates these and the other points raised in this essay.

**Vocation and Response-ability**

To be addressed, to be summoned into thinking requires that one have the capacity to listen if one is to be able-to-respond to what one has heard. As able to respond one becomes responsive; one becomes responsible. But listening in a responsible way is a complex affair. How often does one hear a question that arouses an emotional reaction against the question and the one who raised it? ‘Who’ is hearing the question here? And, from the other side, ‘Who’ is asking it? The dynamics here are as complex as they are in the case of two lovers. Being psychologically deaf is not so uncommon. Complex unconscious residues build up in the ear like wax does. Mary Shelly’s *Frankenstein* is, as the subtitle to the tale suggests, a modern myth for our time. Victor Frankenstein who personifies the spirit of enlightened reason is a ‘deaf’ man. He hears but fails to listen to the entreaties of his creation and as consequence brings ruin upon those whom he loves and himself.

If education awakens us to how we are addressed by the ‘other’ both within and without, then procedures need to be in place that will help us to remove the complex obstacles impeding our ability to listen. *The Wounded Researcher* developed some of these procedures within the context of an approach to research that makes a place for the unconscious and which, in doing so, differentiates the researcher’s conscious intentions for the work from what is unfinished in the work. This process of differentiation takes place within a transference field between a researcher and his or her work.

Perhaps even more than the value of dreams, the notion of a transference field between an analyst and the patient was and is the most significant insight of a depth orientation to psychotherapy. Its acknowledgement undercuts Descartes’ nightmare of an interior Cogito, of a dis-embodied self that is separated from the other. This field is a field of contagion where we infect, as it were, each other with our unexamined desires, fantasies, complexes, and other unconscious dynamics, and it functions as much in the relation between teacher and student as it does between analyst and patient.

In the beginning, Freud understood this complex arena as a matter of the patient’s projection onto the analyst, but in time he admitted the reciprocal character of this dynamic and spoke of the analyst’s projections onto the patient as counter-transference. Through his studies of alchemy and his deepening of the unconscious beyond the personally repressed to the collective unconscious, Jung, in his essay ‘The Psychology of the Transference’ (*CW* 16, 1946/1954), extended this field beyond projections to include archetypal dynamics, which, like the invisible lines of force that arrange a magnetic or gravitational field, structure the field between the participants. In addition, he further deepened our understanding of the unconscious and its impact on the transference when, in his essay ‘On the Nature of the Psyche’ (*CW* 8, 1946/1960), he developed in his dialogues with quantum physics the idea of the deepest, psychoidal, level of the unconscious.

Jung’s essay, which is discussed in detail in chapter one of *The Wounded Researcher*, is very difficult. But it is also extremely important because in it he offers from many sources evidence that what depth psychology originally named the unconscious is more than a
psychological reality. At the psychoid level the unconscious is the consciousness of nature. It is what used to be known as the lumen naturae or the anima mundi long before we took leave of our senses and, parting company with the natural world, declared it inanimate (cf. Romanyszyn, 1989/2000). To take leave of our senses is to break the natal bond between what Merleau-Ponty called the flesh of the body and the flesh of the world (1964/1968), an aesthetic bond of reciprocal desire, which is the starting point of his phenomenology. I refer to Merleau-Ponty because phenomenology, as a necessary companion to depth psychology, also contributes to our understanding of the transference field in two ways. First, through its recovery of the lived body as opposed to the body as object, it re-imagines the transference field as a gestural field (Romanyszyn, in press). Second, in the works of J. H. van den Berg (1961, 1970, 1971) phenomenology moves beyond its essentialist biases and addresses itself to cultural and historical differences.

The transference field as it arose in the therapy room is composed of multiple levels from the repressed complexes through the collective-archetypal and cultural-historical to the psychoid levels. This deepest and most archaic level where psyche and nature are one indicates that the natural world has its dynamic presence in the transference field. Since at all levels this complex field functions, by definition, outside conscious awareness, the presence of the natural world in this field is a symptomatic one. Today one cannot, and ethically should not, deal with our suffering apart from its connection with the suffering of nature. Our depressions, for example, are inseparable from what is happening to the environment in the same way that our cancers are. The same point applies to our systems of education. Our pedagogies impose upon us the ethical demand to be responsive to voices other than our own and it is in response to this ethical obligation that I have attempted to translate this notion of the transference field from the therapy room to the classroom.

The Wounded Researcher offers a detailed description of transference dialogues, which are the procedures employed at the four levels of the transference field. Designed to make a place not only for the voices of cultural diversity, but also for all the complex voices of psychological life, these dialogues are modeled on Jung’s process of active imagination. In addition, I draw upon the work of Jungian analyst August Cwik who showed the connection between active imagination and D.W. Winnicott’s description of play as a transitional space that mediates between psyche and world. This last point is important because it shifts somewhat the negative emphasis that is usually associated with the unconscious and affirms, as Jung does, its creative potential. Of course, the former cannot be ignored and I acknowledge the safeguards that are necessary in this work.

At each of four levels the intention of the dialogues is to open a space where one can be addressed by the ‘other’. It is a way of systematically challenging one’s fixed and unexamined assumptions about one’s perspective, a way of showing that one is always ‘located’ in some perspective even if one does not consciously know what that is. These dialogues, therefore, are a process that helps toward the development of a metaphoric sensibility, which, as I showed above, opens one to the necessity for dialogue that situates ‘who’ one is within a field of listening. In these dialogues one is asked to be responsible by being responsive to the other. This process, which consists of two phases the second of which has five steps, is detailed in The Wounded Researcher and many examples of the process are cited. A preliminary version was also published in Harvest: International
Journal of Jungian Studies (2006). Here I will give a basic description of how the process starts at each level in order to illustrate its contributions toward a mode of pedagogy as fundamentally ethical.

At the personal level of the unconscious one invites ‘others’ from their family constellation, familial history and personal biography to bring their perspective to the work. The encounter can be recorded as a script, or drawn, painted or even enacted in a bodily fashion. This level of engagement with the ‘other’ is often the easiest one to do, and generally the cast of characters who are part of this field are fantasies that personify an individual’s complex projections. At the cultural-historical level, however, one invites ‘others’ of a different gender, race, economic class, culture or period in history to bring their perspective to the work. Already, the process has further de-centered the position of the ego as the singular voice of the work, and on occasion literary figures become part of the encounter.

These figures can also be complex projections embedded in the cultural unconscious of the individual, but they might also be imaginal figures as discussed earlier in this essay. As such these characters are autonomous; they are not projections of the individual’s complex unconscious. It is not always possible to say with certainty whether these figures who enter the transference field are complex or imaginal characters. But in the end this judgment does not matter, since the intention here is to make the unconscious as conscious as possible in service to the ethical obligation to be as responsive to the ‘other’ as one is able to be.

This de-centering of the ego continues as one next invites ‘others’ from the archetypal-collective level of the unconscious to take their place. Here the encounter is with the imaginal ‘other’. This field might include mythological, literary or historical characters whose presence feels as real as one’s contemporaries but who belong neither to the material nor mental domains. Jung’s encounter with Philemon, which he describes in his autobiography, offers a good example of this type of field (1965). This level of encounter, along with the next one, is most difficult to engage, because it so deeply challenges the ego’s positions of control and authority. It invites one to enter a space where one’s sense of identity as univocal, centered and fixed is put into question. For the ego this level is in effect the nightmare side of Descartes’ dream of reason, which, as we have seen, has itself become a nightmare. At the psychoidal level of the unconscious one invites any of the ‘others’ with whom one shares creation to bring in their perspective. It is not uncommon here to encounter the wise animal (as a kind of spirit guide) found in fairytales and who shows a path into the work.

This process of transference dialogues is an on-going experiment in service to making a place for the unconscious in education. While it is still a work in progress with numerous questions to be considered, it does show that ‘who’ one is as author is companioned by ‘who’ one is in many ways as an agent in service to some larger issues beyond the self and its conscious intentions. In this respect, education might more directly serve the purpose of making one responsive to the unfinished issues of the day. Ellen MacFarland’s book (2008) is an excellent example of this point. A psychotherapist, who specialized in the treatment of early childhood abuse and whose own complex vocation to her work was rooted in the abuse she suffered, she made use of the transference dialogues in her dissertation work with me at Pacifica Graduate Institute. In
the context of these dialogues she became responsive to the deep connections between childhood abuse and our abuse of nature and has become now an avowed spokesperson for the natural world.

**Toward an Ethical Pedagogy**

Considering the implications of Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy for ethical education, May and Semetsky note, ‘it is what we do not know, rather than what we do, that is of educational significance’ (2008, p. 143; italics in original). This lacuna in our knowledge is not just an absence of information that can be remedied by more education. Rather this not-knowing is, as they assert, attributable to the fact that ‘much of our world, as well as our learning, are unconscious rather than conscious’ (2008, p. 143). My intention in this essay has been to show how making a place for the complex unconscious dynamics in the educational process lays a foundation for an ethical pedagogy. Along these lines I have applied a Jungian approach to this task, which I have been developing the past fifteen years. There is, as I said earlier, an urgency to this task for we cannot solve the political, economic, environmental, and other problems we face today at the same level at which they were created: a way of knowing and being that leaves out of the picture the radical insights about the unconscious first articulated in the therapy room more than a hundred years ago, that place that was and remains a new form of education.

In *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*, Erich Neumann makes this point:

> The old ethic is a partial ethic ... it fails to take into consideration or to evaluate the tendencies and effects of the unconscious ... Within the life of the community, this takes the shape of the psychology of the scapegoat; in international relations it appears in the form of those epidemic outbreaks of atavistic mass reactions known as war. (1973, p. 74)

In 1946 Jung wrote that the hypothesis of the unconscious ‘is of absolutely revolutionary significance in that it could radically alter our view of the world’ (*CW* 8, para. 369). That revolution has not happened in education or anywhere else. And now the need seems even greater. Some twenty years later in one of his last works, his autobiography, Jung emphasized that the images of the unconscious place a great responsibility upon a man and that developing insight into them ‘must be converted into [our] ethical obligation’ (1965, p. 193). Our pedagogical practices bear this responsibility today as their greatest challenge. How can we expect to be responsive to the other if we who educate are still irresponsible? The transference dialogues could be a start toward the self-education of the educator.

**Notes**

1. Editor’s note: in educational philosophy, John Dewey criticized a spectator theory of knowledge firmly grounded in Cartesian dualism.
2. Editor’s note: Dustin Hoffman played Willy Loman on the Broadway stage and in the 1985 TV movie ‘Death of a Salesman’.
3. Editor’s note: Nel Noddings, in her many works, has advocated enriching mathematics and science curriculum with the elements of the ethics of care.

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